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2Abstract
This paper examines the phenomenon of cross-border property lending and examines a number of
issues regarding lending procedures and decision making processes in the context of the relationship
between lender and professional advisor.
It commences by placing these procedures and processes in the context of the development of cross
border European property investment and finance.  The UK has been a popular destination for
overseas investors and lenders over the last decade and is therefore used as a case study to examine
the additional institutional risk that overseas lenders may face when operating outside of their own
country and obtaining advice from home professionals.
The UK market was the subject of a boom period during the late 1980s, followed by a recession in
the early 1990s.  The losses triggered a number of professional negligence actions by lenders against
valuers.  These include a number of overseas lenders mainly from Europe and these cases have been
examined for any particular features which, coupled with other data gained from overseas lenders as
part of an interview survey, could be used to isolate any significant problems for European lenders
in overseas markets..
The research identified a lack of clarity in roles and relationships between lender and advisor,
difficulties in communications both internally and between overseas branches and headquarters and
failures in provision and interpretation of advice.  The paper concludes by identifying the issues
which may need to be addressed generally by lenders and their advisors, when the lenders are
operating in overseas markets.
31. Aim, Objectives and Methodology
During the 1990s, there has been a substantial increase in the number of reported and unreported
cases in the UK of lenders suing valuers for alleged negligent valuations and a number of these
cases involved overseas lending institutions, including mainland European lenders.   The objectives
of this paper are to examine the incidence, sources and trends in European cross-border real estate
investment and lending on property transactions, to compare them with the cases involving home or
overseas lenders against valuers in the UK and to identify any particular or significant features
which may be contributing to the occurrence of these cases.  The aim of the research is to identify
any issues which could be addressed between overseas lender and valuer to diminish the chances of
the transaction ending in a professional liability action.  Although the paper concentrates on cross
border lending in Europe, the issues identified are seen as having wider international implications.
The research undertaken in order to achieve these aims and objectives can be divided into three main
sub-areas, comprising literature and other sources, structured interviews with selected lenders and a
content analysis of decided negligent valuation cases in the UK.
The first stage of the research was an examination of the phenomenon of cross-border investment in
and lending on real estate in Europe to illustrate the sources and trends. As the main analysis of the
legal issues was based on the experience of overseas lenders in the UK, the background contextual
information concentrated on flows of finance into the UK.  The sources on cross border real estate
investment, particularly overseas bank lending, within Europe are poor and a true and accurate
picture is difficult to draw.  However, this information is only required to place the main body of the
paper into context and past and present trends within Europe are clearly identifiable from the
existing data.  This data shortage is very apparent from the most recent research by the Economist
Intelligence Unit (1997) into Foreign Direct Investment commissioned by the UK based Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors
4This paper also draws on information obtained as part of another project reported in two working
papers  (Crosby, et.al., 1997a; 1997b).  Survey work for that study included four overseas banks,
two European and two Asian, who took part in a series of structured interviews designed to obtain
more detailed information on lending practices, particularly in relation to selection and instruction
of, and reliance on, valuers to advise on the adequacy of property as security.  The responses given
were capable of being compared, and, in some instances, contrasted, with those given by their local
equivalents, in this case five UK lenders.  This research examined the whole loan valuation process
including bases of valuation and reporting of values.
The main phase of the research for this paper was a detailed study of those cases where risk
exposure issues would be expected to be most acute, namely, where losses had been sustained as a
result of property finance transactions.  Previous research resulted in the development of an
extensive database comprising all the reported and many unreported decisions of the courts in
professional negligence cases concerning valuers and other property professionals.  The cases in
question derive chiefly from the UK, although there are significant numbers of cases from
Commonwealth countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada.  A number of these cases
involve lenders from overseas and property professionals from the UK.
Accordingly, the research team carried out an analysis of decided negligence cases involving
property lending in the UK since two landmark cases occurred in 1977. Forty-eight cases have been
decided in the period 1991 to 1996, representing valuations of commercial and residential property
carried out in the UK from 1983 to 1991. The incidence of overseas banks in these cases was
compared to the incidence of overseas bank lending in the UK real estate market. The search was
then refined to identify those cases involving overseas, mainly European, lenders.  Special attention
was paid to those cases where allegations by the lender against local consultants were met by
5counter-allegations of negligent lending practice on the part of the plaintiffs, so as to amount to an
arguable defence of contributory negligence.
The cases extracted were examined in detail to identify common features and trends, including any
consistency or otherwise with equivalents involving UK lenders.  The evidence of attitudes on the
part of overseas banks obtained by the structured interviews was utilised to assist in this stage.
The analysis of the evidence obtained by the methods described above enabled the authors to
proceed to the conclusions set out in Section 5 below.  The findings themselves are set out and
discussed in Sections 2 to 4.
62. The Market Context
2.1 Cross-border real estate investment
Property markets in the 1980s and 1990s have performed similarly in many countries and regions of
the world, not just Europe.  The long term rising market in rental values in the 1980s was followed
by recession in the 1990s.  Figure 1 illustrates that general trend for the market in offices in six
major centres in Europe.
Figure 1.    Rental Values in Six Major European Centres - Offices End 1986 - End 1996
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All six centres suffered nominal falls in rental values between the end of 1989 and the end of 1993,
commencing with London and finishing with Brussels.  Capitalisation rates also moved upwards
exacerbating any capital value reductions caused by rent reductions.  The central London monthly
office capital value index almost halved between the end of 1989 and 1992 (IPD, 1992).
The boom of the late 1980s, followed by the recession in the early 1990s, coincided with an increase
in the total new money being invested into investment property.  In the UK, this was around £4
billion in 1986, rising to around £8 billion in 1987, over £10 billion in 1988, peaking at £14 billion
7in 1989 (DTZ, 1996a). In Germany, the commercial property investment market increased from
DM 5.4 billion in 1980 to nearly DM11 billion in 1989 (see Figure 2.).
Figure 2.   Annual Turnover German Commercial Property Investment Market 1980-1990
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A significant feature of many investment markets in the 1980s was the increasing amount of cross
border investment.  In the UK, the level of inward investment by overseas residents rose from £4.5
billion in 1985 to a peak of £18.5 billion in 1989 and 1990.  Property shared in this new
phenomenon; overseas investment in UK property took off in 1988, rising from around £250 million
in 1987 to nearly £2 billion in 1988 and over £3 billion in 1989 and 1990 (DTZ, 1996a).  Figure 3.
illustrates the overall level of overseas investment in the UK property market for the period 1988 to
1996 (Sept) and shows that the amount has levelled off during the 1990s at between £2 and £3
billion per annum.
8Figure 3.  Annual Overseas Investment in UK Real Estate 1988-1996
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In Germany, overseas investors contributed nearly DM1.5 billion in 1985 rising to DM4 billion in
1990.  A significant portion of these overseas funds came from Sweden in the the late 1980s and the
Japanese were the heaviest non European investors.  A survey by the Munchener Institute reported
in JLW (1991) estimated that DM16 billion of real estate owned by overseas investors in 1990 was
shared as in Table 1.
Table 1 -  Breakdown of German Real Estate Owned by Overseas Investors 1990
DM Billions
Scandanavia (chiefly Sweden) 5.5
Netherlands 4.0
Great Britain 2.5
Japan 1.5
USA 1.0
France 0.5
Near East 0.5
Other 0.5
Source : JLW (1991)
9This indicates that the Dutch were also active in overseas markets in the 1980s.  By November
1994,  Dutch property holdings in Europe totalled DFI 13.05 billion; 34% in Germany, 26% in the
UK, 25% in France and 10% in Belgium.  Overseas property holdings in the Netherlands totalled
DFI 6.9 billion; 58% held by Scandanavian countries and 26% by Germany (Dijkstra, 1995).
These major sources of cross border activity are mirrored in the UK.  Figure 4. illustrates that, in
the late 1980s, the main overseas investors were from Sweden and Japan, investing around £2.3
billion and £3.2 billion respectively in the period 1988 to 1990.  Dutch investors were active in
1988 with £500 million purchased but withdrew before the Japanese and Swedes.  However, from
1992 onwards, the Germans dominated overseas investment, nearly £3 billion being invested
between 1992 and September 1996.  The large USA investment in 1995 was the result of the
purchase of Canary Wharf in London’s Docklands.
Figure 4.   Sources of Annual Overseas Investment into UK Real Estate 1988 - 1996
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In the UK, overseas investors have tended to concentrate on London, which accounts for over 80%
of investment since 1988, the majority in the City, West End and Mid Town core markets.  The
exception in 1995 relates again to the Canary Wharf purchase in Docklands (Figure 5.).  JLW
(Solomans, 1995) estimate that, between 1990 and 1994, German investment in central London
totalled £2 billion as set out in Table 2.
Table 2  -  German Investment in Central London 1990 - 1994 (£Million)
Year Private Sources Institutions Banks Total
1990 24 12 36 72
1991 53 91 36 180
1992 303 157 162 622
1993 403 183 80 666
1994 173 316 37.5 526.5
Total 956 759 315.5 2030.5
Figure 5.  Annual Overseas Investment in UK Real Estate by Region
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2.2 Cross-border real estate lending
The increase in overseas activity in the real estate market has seen a corresponding increase in the
number of overseas banks locating in London.  In 1980, there were 71 US banks, 141 European
Banks, 24 Japanese and 147 other overseas banks located in London.  By 1990, this had increased
to 53 US, 207 European, 51 Japanese and 167 other overseas.  Over the period, 245 new banks had
set up offices with only 132 closing down, some the result of mergers (Beardsley, 1996).  By 1990,
there were a total of 478 overseas banks represented in London.
Outstanding bank debt owed by UK property companies increased from £2.2 billion in 1980 to a
peak of £40 billion in 1991, before reducing to the current amount of £30 billion in September 1996
(Figure 6.).
Figure 6 : Total Outstanding Bank Debt Owed by UK Property Companies
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In France, Morling (Rowe, 1997) estimated that outstanding bank lending to property totalled
FFR315 billion in 1995, having reduced from FFR350 billion in 1994 and FFR375 billion in 1993.
12
European Mortgage Federation figures suggest that the outstanding loans against mortgages on
commercial property between 1985 and 1993 increased by 125% in Belgium, 143% in Italy, 44% in
Portugal, 202% in Spain and 42% in Greece.  In Germany, the increase was 138%, while in the
Netherlands it increased by 53% between 1985 and 1989, before falling back 25% to 1993 (RICS,
1995).
Despite the different kinds of lending included in the various national figures, it is clear that the
exposure of international lenders to the property sector increased during the 1980s.  In the UK, only
20% of the outstanding property company debt was owed to overseas banks in 1980 but, by 1990,
this had increased to 43%.  They have since reduced their exposure to 35%.  Figure 7. illustrates the
respective shares of the UK clearers, other UK banks, Japanese, US and other overseas banks.
Figure 7.   Total Outstanding Bank Debt Owed by UK Property Companies 1980-1996
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Given the importance of London in the property investment market in the UK, a Richard
Ellis/Gallup (1995) survey of 62 overseas investors and 51 overseas banks canvassed their
13
perceptions and future intentions towards London.  The prospects for the London market were very
favourably viewed, with positive responses concerning rental and capital growth prospects, the
importance of London as an international financial centre, UK economic growth prospects and the
length of leases.  A majority of investor respondents who expressed an opinion thought London
would perform better than any other City in Europe and 61% said there was no other city in the
world in which they would prefer to invest.
The bankers shared the view on the prospects of London but were more concerned with the stability
of cash flow generated by the structure of leases in the UK.  Investment and lending since the survey
has tended to confirm those findings.  International investment and overseas bank lending has
continued during 1995 and the first three quarters of 1996.
The evidence suggests that overseas investment and bank lending on commercial property will
continue to be a major factor in centres around the world, with London and the UK being a favoured
home for some of these international funds.  There have been some failures, most notably the
Swedish and Japanese in the late 1980s, countered by some equally spectacular successes, most
notably by the Germans in the over-rented London office market of the early to middle 1990s.  This
paper is more concerned with the repercussions of the failures.
These failures are not confined to Europe.  It is estimated that by 1993 Japanese investors had a $77
billion exposure to the US real estate market.  Kennedy and Matsuo suggest that the problems of
Japanese investors stemmed from five factors; but that they all centred on:
“an apparent lack of understanding or naiveté on the part of Japanese
investors with respect to the US market.  Many assumptions made by
Japanese investors were predicated on an understanding of the domestic
Japanese real estate market as opposed to the foreign market of US real
estate.”.
(Kennedy and Matsuo, 1996, p9)
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In addition to investment market risks, there may also be additional legal and procedural risks in
investing or lending in foreign environments.   A lack of detailed understanding of cultural, political,
legal and social factors may lead to misunderstandings of, or undue reliance on, advice received
from professionals operating within the particular market.  These institutional risks can lead to
‘Home Asset Bias’ (Geurts and Jaffe, 1996; Uppal, 1992), investing in a home market rather than
obtaining the diversification benefits of the overseas market because of the lack of knowledge of the
institutional context of the country concerned.  One such institutional factor is the ability of a client
to sue a professional advisor and to claim damages for negligent actions.  In the UK, this ability
exists but exercising it has risks attached.
A number of overseas lenders, exposed to losses in the aftermath of the recession and the property
crash, decided to try to recover their losses by claiming that they had been badly advised by the
local market professionals carrying out property valuations prior to lending.   By adopting this
course of action, the banks’ own processes and procedures were examined in the course of the
hearings and revealed some interesting insights into the lending process.  The remainder of this
paper considers whether lenders have particular difficulties lending in overseas markets, beyond
those lending in home markets, by examining the detail of these cases and comparing them with
similar cases involving UK lenders.  Conclusions can then be made regarding the particular steps
which may need to be taken by overseas lenders to address any procedural problem, and so reduce
the institutional risks of lending in overseas markets.
15
3. Incidence of Decided Cases
The history of institutional lenders suing valuers in the UK really started with the two landmark
cases of Singer and Friedlander Ltd v John D Wood & Co [1977] 2 EGLR 84 and Corisand
Investments Ltd v Druce and Co  [1978] 2 EGLR 86.  As with the recent spate of legal actions,
both these cases arose in the aftermath of a slump in the commercial property market. The extent
and duration of this slump in actual values was significantly less than the recession of the 1990s
although in real terms it was similar. At such times, there is an obvious increased risk that the
borrower may be over-exposed and may default in repayment of the loan; that the property will have
fallen in value to a point where it provides insufficient security for the outstanding debt; and that the
lender will then seek to recoup its losses by an action for negligence against the valuer on whose
report the lender relied in agreeing to make the loan (Crosby, et.al., 1997a).
Between 1979 and 1990, a period of sustained (with a few very minor exceptions) period of value
growth in all sectors of the UK property market, only 5 lender-valuer claims appear to have reached
the courts. These were all concerned with valuations of residential property. They are Anglia
Hastings & Thanet Building Society v House & Son [1981] 2 EGLR 17; London & South of
England Building Society v Stone [1982] 1 EGLR 139, [1983] 3 All ER 105, [1983] 2 EGLR 131;
Testabridge Investments Ltd v David Restall & Associates (1985, unreported); Predeth v Castle
Phillips Finance Co Ltd [1986] 2 EGLR 144; and Swingcastle Ltd v Alastair Gibson [1991] 2 All
ER 353, [1991] 1 EGLR 157.
From 1991 to the present time, a number of factors have combined to render litigation between
lenders and valuers significantly different from that seen in the previous case law, to such an extent
that this research is based exclusively on the cases decided during the later period.
Tables 3 and 4 set out the details of cases decided between 1991 and 1996 concerning commercial
(Table 3) and residential (Table 4) property valuations carried out between 1983 and 1991.
16
Table 3 - Negligence Actions Involving Commercial Property
Date of
valuation
Cases UK
lenders
European
(+O/S)
lenders
Contributory
negligence
Cont Neg
UK lenders
Cont Neg
European
(+O/S) lenders
1983 1 1 0 0 0 0
1984 1 1 0 1 1 0
1985 1 0 1 1 0 1
1988 5 2 2(+1) 3 1 2
1989 10 5 4 9 4 5
1990 4 1 1(+2) 4 1 1(+2)
1991 1 1 0 0 0 0
Total 23 11 9(+3) 18 7 9(+2)
Table 4 - Negligence Actions Involving Residential Property
Date of
valuation
Cases UK
lenders
European
lenders
Contributory
negligence
Cont Neg
UK lenders
Cont Neg
European lenders
1987 2 2 0 0 0 0
1988 2 1 1 2 1 1
1989 8 7 1 2 1 1
1990 11 6 5 6 3 3
1991 2 1 1 0 0 0
Total 25 17 8 10 5 5
Fifteen out of 23 commercial valuation cases (65%) were carried out in the boom period of 1988
and 1989, while an additional four were carried out in the first year of the ‘collapse’ which is
generally acknowledged to be the end of 1989. This illustrates a repeat of the 1970s scenario; loans
and/or purchases made at the height of the ‘boom’, a loan default or other financial problem
coinciding with the collapse of the market and then losses by the lender being exacerbated by
difficulties of selling in weak economic conditions.
The peaking of the residential owner-occupied market in the UK is less easy to identify.  An
artificial stimulus was supplied during the spring of 1988 by the announcement that the Government
17
would change the tax status of mortgage holders in August of that year by reducing tax relief.
Purchasers entered the market to beat the August deadline.  Comments on the state of the residential
market by expert witnesses within individual cases tend to suggest that the market weakened
considerably after August 1988 but actual falls in value only became apparent from the middle of
1989 and, in some regions, even later.  Although a considerable number of cases involved valuations
in late 1989 and 1990, after the peak in the market, it is apparent that these cases represent
valuations at levels which were perceived to be at or near the peak.  The litigation cycle is therefore
similar to the commercial cases.
It is noticeable that overseas lenders figure very strongly as a proportion of the parties concerned.
Despite the fact that only around 40% of outstanding bank debt was owed to them by UK property
companies from 1990 to 1996, overseas lenders were involved in over half the commercial property
valuation cases (but only around 30% of the residential property cases).  Moreover, of the 20
actions bought by overseas lenders, all but three concerned banks from mainland Europe.
Another feature worthy of comment is the number of cases concerning overseas institutions where
contributory negligence was an issue.  Again, it may be regarded as disproportionate when
compared with the UK lender cases.  Given that, until 1991, in the UK valuers had not run the
defence of contributory negligence against lenders suing them (although it had been done in New
Zealand over a decade ago in Kendall-Wilson Securities v Barraclough [1986] NZLR 576), it is
surprising that as many as 28 out of 48 (58%) contain an argument of that defence.  It is even more
surprising that, in the cases involving overseas lenders, that figure is 16 out of 20 (80%), compared
with 12 out of 28 (43%) in the cases involving UK lenders.  This disparity is especially material in
the residential cases; the proportions are less uneven in the commercial sector.
In fairness, it should be noted that the allegations of contributory negligence have only benefited the
defence in eight cases out of 28 (29%) where they were made, resulting in reductions of between
18
15% and 30% of damages awarded.  Of those eight, five concerned commercial property (Banque
Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 769, [1994] 2 EGLR 108;
Nyckeln Finance Co Ltd v Stumpbrook Continuation Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 143; South Australian
Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd [1995] 2 EGLR 219; Barclays Bank plc v
William H Brown Ltd [1996] NPC 184 and I terallianz Finanz AG v Independent Insurance Co
Ltd [1997] NPC 89)  and three concerned residential property (BNP Mortgages Ltd v Key
Surveyors Nationwide Ltd (1994, unreported); Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd
[1996] EGCS  146 and Chelsea Building Society v Goddard & Smith [1996] EGCS 157.).
More significantly, perhaps, five of the eight involved overseas lenders, four of them European.  To
these may be added four more where the judge held that the contributory negligence of the lender
was sufficiently serious to justify holding the lender responsible for up to 80% of the loss (Nyckeln
Finance Company Ltd v Edward Symmons & Partners (1995, unreported); First National Bank plc
v Andrew S Taylor (Commercial) Ltd [1995] EGCS 200; PK Finans International (UK) Limited v
Andrew Downs & Co Ltd [1992] 1 EGLR 172 and Credit Agricole Personal Finance plc v Murray
[1995] EGCS 32.  It was only the failure of the lender’s claim that rendered these findings purely
academic.  In total, contributory negligence by the lender has been found to exist in 12 cases, eight
involving overseas lenders, with seven of those from mainland Europe.
Table 5 sets out the grounds on which the contributory negligence defence was founded in the 28
cases and details the success or failure of the defence.
Table 5 : Contributory negligence (results and grounds)
Total (1) Commercial (2) Residential (3)
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Inadequate checks on borrower 4 13 2 8 2 5
Failure by lender to follow own rules 5 3 2 3 3
19
Imprudent lending policy 1 3 2 1 1
Blind reliance on valuation 4 4 4 3 1
Other negligent conduct 2 1 2 1
Total 16 24 10 17 6 7
Notes to Table 5
(1) Total number of cases 28 : Total of 40 in column 1 includes a number of the 28 cases where multiple grounds
for contributory negligence were tested.
(2) Yes = Defence allowed No = Defence disallowed.
Table 6 sets out details of the eight cases where contributory negligence was allowed and the four
additional cases where the judge stated that the defence would have been allowed had the valuer
been found liable.  It identifies the amount of the reduction in damages that was, or would have
been, awarded and shows which of the cases involved European or other overseas lenders.
Table 6 : Contributory negligence : successful defences and reductions in damages
Grounds
Cases where Contributory
Negligence Allowed
Cases where Cont
Neg would have
been Allowed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Inadequate checks on borrower
* * * *
Failure by lender to follow own
rules * * * * *
Imprudent lending
policy *
Blind reliance on
valuation * * * *
Other negligent
conduct *
Percentage
reduction
30 20 25 25 25 20 25 15 15 80 75 75
Mainland European (E)
Overseas (OS) or
UK lender
E E E O
S
U
K
U
K
U
K
E E E E U
K
As indicated in Table 5, more than one-half of all the cases in which contributory negligence has
been pleaded (almost three-quarters in the residential field) contain the allegation by the valuer that
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the lender failed to carry out a sufficient check on the creditworthiness of the borrower. However,
such allegations in themselves have led to a finding of contributory negligence on only four
occasions (two actual, two obiter). Such allegations are frequently based on evidence that the lender
was actually aware of facts concerning the borrower which, it is claimed, should have prompted
further enquiries. It has also been argued that, where solicitors acting for the lender are aware of
such facts, their knowledge should be attributed to the lender, for the purpose of establishing
contributory negligence. However, while two judges appear to have accepted that knowledge may be
imputed in this way in HIT Finance Ltd v Lewis & Tucker Ltd [1993] 2 EGLR 231 and Axa Equity
& Law Home Loans Ltd v Goldsack & Freeman [1994] 1 EGLR 175,  a third has stated
categorically that it may not in BFG Bank AG v Brown and Mumford Ltd [1995] EGCS 21.
The second most frequent allegation of contributory negligence against a lender is that of failure to
adhere to its own internal lending rules or guidelines, or to act on advice given by its own staff. A
defence based on these grounds has proved successful on four occasions in South Australian Asset
Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd [1995] 2 EGLR 219; BNP Mortgages Ltd v Key
Surveyors Nationwide Ltd (1994, unreported); Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd
[1996] EGCS  146 and Chelsea Building Society v Goddard & Smith [1996] EGCS 157.
In several cases, valuers have based a defence of contributory negligence on an allegation that the
basic lending policy of the particular lender is one which no prudent and reasonable lender would
adopt. Such an allegation (relating to the practice of “non-status” or “self-certification” loans) has
been specifically rejected in Bank of Scotland v WG Edwards (1995) 44 Con LR 77.  In Ba que
Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 769, [1994] 2 EGLR 108, a
lender was also absolved of negligence in agreeing to advance 90% of the valuation of a commercial
property (of which the top 20% was subject to mortgage indemnity guarantee insurance).  However,
in what may prove to be an important recent development, a lender was held contributorily negligent
in Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd [1996] EGCS 146 by adopting a loan-to-
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valuation ratio of 70% in relation to a high-value residential property (which was regarded by the
court as especially difficult to value accurately).
The most controversial basis for a defence of contributory negligence consists of an assertion by a
valuer that a reasonable lender would not have placed unquestioning reliance on the valuation which
was provided. This is controversial because it suggests in effect that a client who has taken and paid
for specialist professional advice may remain under some obligation to subject that advice to critical
scrutiny and not simply to act upon it. Taken to its logical conclusion, the effect of such a
proposition is that, the more negligent the valuation, the more likely the valuer is to evade part at
least of the liability for it. Ironically, this is precisely the ground on which the first two successful
pleas of contributory negligence in lender-valuer actions were based (Banqu  Brux lles Lambert SA
v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 769, [1994] 2 EGLR 108; Nyckeln Finance Co Ltd
v Stumpbrook Continuation Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 143), and has now been successful again in
Barclays Bank plc v William H Brown Ltd [1996] NPC 184 and I terallianz Finanz AG v
Independent Insurance Co Ltd [1997] NPC 89.  In respect of commercial property, these four cases
represent four out of the only five cases where contributory negligence has been successfully
pleaded.
The final observation to be made from an analysis of the incidence of reported and unreported cases
is that there appears to be no instance of a defence of contributory negligence being based upon the
fact that the lender accepted a valuation commissioned by the borrower, not the lender. This
presents a clear danger of conflict of interest or even fraud and this aspect is expanded upon in
Section 4 of this paper.
4. Issues Arising from an Analysis of the Mainland European and the one other Overseas
Lender Cases
22
The previous sections of this paper have investigated the market context, analysed the incidence of
cases and identified sucessful grounds for pleas of contributory negligence. However, as this
research is aimed at the process of lending in overseas markets, more detailed analysis of the cases
involving overseas lenders, mainly European, was undertaken.  This more detailed investigation
immediately reveals that UK courts have made no allowance for the special position of overseas
lenders.  In PK Finans International (UK) Limited v Andrew Downs & Co Ltd [1992] 1 EGLR
172, no allowance was made in either the standards expected of the lenders or the standards
demanded of a valuer acting for them.
More detailed analysis identified three issues which are examined below.  Other issues were also
identified but are not any more relevant to overseas lenders than to domestic lenders and are
therefore outside the scope of this paper.  The three issues have not all been listed in Table 5 as
successful grounds for a defence of contributory negligence, as they have not all been discussed
within the judgments, or even identified as being a problem.
The three issues are the lack of clarity in roles and relationships between lenders and their
professional advisors, the element of confusion in communication and division of responsibility
within the lender organisation and the lack of ability to interpret or use the professional’s advice.
4.1 Lack of clarity in roles and relationships between lender and advisor
Reference was made in Section 1 to the reporting of related studies in which two of the authors have
been involved (Crosby, et.al., 1997a; 1997b).  One of the conclusions of that work was that it is
desirable to ensure that the consultants responsible for producing the valuation utilised by the
lenders were wholly independent of the prospective borrower.  To put it simply, banks should
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commission their own valuations, and not rely upon any valuation prepared by anyone not instructed
by them, certainly not one commissioned by a party with a potentially conflicting interest, such as a
borrower.  Of the five UK lenders interviewed, four invariably instructed the valuer.  The fifth
would accept a valuation from one of its panel valuers.  Of the four overseas lenders interviewed,
two would accept valuations from other parties.
It is not necessary to subscribe to conspiracy theory in order to suggest that this is a potential cause
for concern.   The French bank BNP may have been unsuccessful in actually proving fraud against
the valuers who had been working with the owner of the property and who had by letter confirmed a
valuation to them in BNP Mortgages Ltd v Goadsby and Harding [1994] 2 EGLR 169, but they
might profitably reflect upon the wisdom of using in such circumstances a valuer whose
performance was described by the judge as follows:
“whilst he was prepared to make statements which were not true in order to
exculpate himself from a charge of negligence, the plaintiffs have not satisfied me
that at the time he had no honest belief in giving the figure that he did....The fact
that he cut many corners, e.g. failing to visit the site, failing to ascertain the sale
position of units 3 and 4, the failure to ascertain the then asking prices for the
unsold units and the fact that almost contemporaneously he was reflecting the
depressed state of the market in (another) valuation are all factors from which a
dishonest belief could be determined.  Indeed as a paper exercise it may be that I
would make such a finding.  But the overwhelming impression I had of him in the
witness box was of a man who had no intention of acting dishonestly but who did
unfortunately show unusual negligence.”
(per Judge James Fox-Andrews QC).
One of the most celebrated examples of losses sustained by an overseas lender in the UK property
market crash was in Ba que Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co [1995] 1 EGLR 129
where a whole series of large loans were made on the security of commercial properties valued by
consultants John D Wood, on the instructions of the borrowers.
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Banque Bruxelles found themselves in the extraordinary position of trying to argue that a contract
had existed between themselves and the consultants.  While the absence of a contract would not
negate the possibility of a duty of care being owed in tort, it cannot have been lost upon the bank
that, if they had instructed their own valuers, they would have been in the position for which they
were contending so vigorously. Indeed, so far were the lenders from knowing what was going on in
the case, namely the approach by an intermediary acting for the borrower to seek ‘armchair
valuations’ from a succession of valuers and submit the highest of these to the lender, that Phillips J
held that the lenders would have been guilty of contributory negligence in lending had they had that
information.  There is some irony in observing that they were too much in ignorance of how the
valuations had been commissioned to make possible the defence of contributory negligence.
Nor is the instruction of valuers for loan purposes the only example of relationships where overseas
lenders have proved vulnerable.  In the case of Ny keln Finance Co Ltd v Edward Symmons and
Partners (1995) unreported, the Swedish finance institution advanced £3.5 million to a company
with £100 share capital controlled by a Mr Shiraz Kassam and his wife, on the security of a
development site which was already the subject of a first charge.  When Mr Kassam’s company
defaulted, the property was valued at much less than the amount of the first charge.
Nyckeln’s UK Managing Director Mr Tanner had retained Mr David Stokes as a consultant to seek
loan business.  This resulted in a confusion of the relationship between the valuers who valued the
site and Nyckeln.  It was contemplated that:
“Nyckeln itself would make contact with the surveyor to inform him what precisely
it was that Nyckeln required.”
This appears on page 11 of the judgement.  Yet by page 16 there is reference to a letter from the
borrower to the valuer which states that:
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 “David Stokes arranged with you to send a letter of valuation regarding (the site).”
This letter, from borrower to valuer, ends with the ominous words:
“As you are aware, your figures are much lower than I think the property is worth
and at present, we do not want to use the valuation.”
Mr Kassam, it appears from page 17, had arranged for the valuer to undertake a valuation, a copy
of which had been sent to the lenders.  Mr Kassam certainly instructed Edward Symmons, the
defendants in the case:
“No one on behalf of Nyckeln gave any instructions to Symmons in relation to the
valuation of the Property.  The instructions given were given by Mr Kassam.”
Nyckeln appears to have relied upon Mr Stokes, whose remuneration was determined by the deals
he could broker, to protect its interests.  The inadvisability of allowing such a person to intervene in
the instruction process becomes apparent from the judge’s conclusions:
“The ineptitude displayed by Mr Stokes and Mr Tanner in relation to the loans to
Meadrealm on the security of the property almost defies belief....I did not form the
impression that either was as grossly incompetent as his behaviour in relation to
the loans to Meadrealm would suggest.......it seemed to me that it was far more
likely that each consciously disregarded his duty to Nyckeln in relation to the loans
to Meadrealm in order to confer benefits effectively upon Mr Kassam.... Although
I harbour very strong suspicions, I do not think it right.... to condemn either Mr
Stokes or Mr Tanner as dishonest.”
Nyckeln did not presumably feel vindicated in their use of Mr Stokes in such an equivocal role by
the Judge’s finding that he was:
 “merely incompetent in high degree.”
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The point is that neither he nor the borrower should have been involved at all in the process of
procuring valuations upon which the security for the loan was to be assessed.
That Nyckeln’s lack of appreciation of this point was not an isolated instance can be established by
reference to their most spectacular reported loss:  Nyckeln Finance Co Ltd v Stumpbrook
Continuation Ltd [1994] 9433 EG 93.  They here lent £21 million on a valuation of £30.5 million in
May 1989, an office block which eventually had to be sold in July 1992 for £3.1 million.  The
purchase, by two Swedish investors, was carried out through a Dutch company formed by one of
them.  It was he who commissioned the valuation from Jackson-Stops and Staff (JSS - later
Stumpbrook).  An approach to Nyckeln by a (Swedish) third party persuaded Nyckeln to reconsider
their refusal to lend.  The judgement of Judge Fawcus records the stark result.  Nyckeln:
 “agreed to lend £21 million after receiving a faxed copy of the JSS valuation, ie
70% of valuation.”
This turned out to be a valuation of a property in respect of which the expert evidence was that the
highest non-negligent valuation at the material time would have been £23.5 million.  The lenders
were no doubt reminded by the evidence given in the trial that lending by Nyckeln was only to be:
 “against satisfactory security which has been valued professionally by an
independent and qualified valuer.”
It is submitted that the lenders may have regretted lending at the instance of a third party in reliance
upon a valuation carried out on the instructions of one of the principal borrowers.
As the information from the lender interviews is that overseas banks seem less concerned about the
source of instructions of valuers and overseas lenders figure prominently in the cases discussed
27
above, this examination of the dangers apparent in not clarifying the relationship between lender and
valuer seems particularly pertinent to lenders operating in overseas markets.
4.2 Confusion in communication and responsibility within the lending organisation
A second notable feature of the lender-valuer case law is the extent to which, in disputes involving
overseas lenders, the lines of communication and divisions of responsibility within the lending
organisation itself have tended to become unclear and a source of confusion. This, it should be said,
appears to relate exclusively to loans on commercial property. To judge from the cases studied, the
practice of overseas lenders operating within the UK residential sector is to devolve upon their local
branch full decision-making responsibility (perhaps because the size of each individual transaction
is comparatively modest).
By contrast, lenders operating in the commercial property market frequently insist that the final
decision on any given loan is taken at head office (ie in the home country). The functions of the UK
branch in such circumstances are restricted to making a recommendation as to a particular loan
(often in respect of business which the UK branch has expended considerable effort to obtain), and
to provide technical support for that recommendation in the sense of obtaining a valuation of the
proposed security, carrying out a credit check on the borrower and so on. These latter functions are
commonly required to be carried out within parameters set by head office in the form of lending
rules or guidelines.
The methods adopted within the commercial sector have caused problems in two particular respects.
The first is that the procedures or guidelines laid down by head office are not always as well
understood as they might be by those whose responsibility it is to implement them at the local level.
In PK Finans International (UK) Limited v Andrew Downs & Co Ltd [1992] 1 EGLR 172, for
example, the plaintiff bank did not appreciate that the valuation of a proposed development was
based upon certain planning assumptions which had not been verified. In holding the bank at fault
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for not showing the valuation to its solicitors (who would undoubtedly have checked the planning
position), the judge said that:
 “the plaintiffs’ procedures left much to be desired, in that there appeared to be
uncertainty about who should process matters and there being an absence of a
recognised procedure for doing so”.
It may not be unreasonable to suggest that a UK lender would have been all too well aware of the
need to lay down a procedure which would:
 “have stated precisely what should have been done, which would have included
sending the valuation to the company’s solicitors”.
An outstanding example of confusion between head office and local branch on the subject of
guidelines is provided by BFG Bank AG v Brown and Mumford Ltd [1995] EGCS 21. Here the
member of the bank’s London office who was handling a particular loan, had virtually no
knowledge of German, the only language in which the bank’s lending criteria were published. Not
only that; the guidelines:
 “were prepared and relate to the German situation in law, in particular as to
planning and so on”.
[An interesting contrast is given by South Australian Asset Management Corporation v York
Montague Ltd [1995] 2 EGLR 219, where the bank’s London office produced its own property
lending policy (which it did not in fact comply with in the particular case); this was unique to
London, and the decision-makers at head office in Adelaide had never seen it.]
The second way in which the division of responsibility between head office and local (UK) branch
has caused problems is more subtle. There is some evidence of a danger that, once a proposed loan
has received head office’s approval in principle,  a local branch may treat its responsibilities as
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routine or trivial and may fail to meet standards of normal banking prudence. In such circumstances
the task of thoroughly checking a proposed loan may fall between two stools. For example, in
Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 769, [1994] 2
EGLR 108, the plaintiffs’ head office gave its London branch authority (known as the “enveloppe”)
to establish a £100m (later increased to £200m) portfolio of insurance-backed loans on commercial
property, subject to strict conditions. It was London’s responsibility to ensure that the conditions of
the enveloppe were satisfied and that the individual transactions were otherwise satisfactory, since:
 “only the London office could judge the quality of a real estate project in London,
the quality of the valuers, the quality of the London market”.
 However, the judge clearly felt that, once granted the enveloppe, the London office proceeded on
the basis that the risk analysis had already been undertaken and that:
 “all that was required was to ensure that the transactions fell within the structure
of the enveloppe and the financial limits of their authority”.
 This limited view of their task led the London office to abandon their normal careful procedures:
“The proposals were never submitted for credit analysis and the account officer’s
consideration and presentation were perfunctory ... they never applied a rigorous
critical analysis to the transactions once their full details, and in particular the
purchase prices, became known”.
A similar down-grading of responsibility by local officials may be seen in Nyck ln Finance Co Ltd
v Stumpbrook Continuation Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 143, where, as set out in the previous section, a
potential borrower made a direct approach to the plaintiffs’ head office in Sweden, armed with a
valuation of £30.5m, and received an offer “in principle” of a loan of £21m, to be processed through
the plaintiffs’ London subsidiary. A senior employee of the London company was sufficiently
uneasy about the valuation to obtain and to pass on to head office informal opinions from two
respected valuers of his acquaintance (that the property was worth between £21m and £23m). He
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also questioned the person responsible for the original valuation but, although feeling that he had not
received a satisfactory explanation:
 “did not feel that he had further grounds for going back to [head office]”!
Not only did this overseas lender accept a valuation commissioned by the borrower, it also suffered
from the lack of communication between head and branch offices.
4.3 Interpretation and use of consultants’ advice
It has already been pointed out in the preceeding section that language may on occasion literally be a
barrier in trying to relate advice to a lending decision.  In the case of Nyckeln Finance Co Ltd v
Edward Symmons [1995] Unreported, it appears that language was not the only bar to
understanding by the lenders of the significance to be attached to valuation reports.  The lenders
appear to have sought to rely upon the valuation figure without feeling the need to assimilate the
exploratory text of the report, despite the limitations of pricing valuations in the lending process
(Crosby, et.al., 1997a).  They alleged that:
 “in effect, the client was entitled simply to look at the stated valuation figure and
to ignore the remainder of a valuation report as mere verbiage.”
The view of Richard Seymour QC presiding was that the lender was not entitled to presume this.
The lenders had been wrong in seeking to place reliance upon a figure in isolation:
“it is not negligent for a valuer who explains in his report what he has done, and
what assumptions he has made, to put forward a valuation, even if such valuation
was undertaken on bases which no reasonably competent valuer would have
adopted.”
This was the crux of the case and the principal reason why the lenders were unable to recover
against the consultants:
31
“a reasonably prudent lender reading the Report would have understood, as Mr
Stokes did.... that the critical premise upon which the valuation of Scheme 2 was
based was that the Scheme was successfully completed.  A reasonably prudent
lender would certainly not have relied upon the Report as a valuation of the
Property in its existing, unimproved condition.”
It was mentioned in Section 4.1 above that in Nyckeln Finance v Stumpbrook Continuation Ltd the
lenders had responded to a faxed valuation from valuers they had not instructed by lending £21
million to a Dutch company set up for the purpose of purchasing the subject property.  The lender’s
reliance on the valuation is almost touching in its simple faith.  The Swedish banker, Mr.
Palmstierna of Nyckeln:
“did rely on the valuation because he knew of JSS as a reputable firm, who were
on the (lender’s) panel of approved valuers”
They did so although or perhaps because:
“there was no one within the group in Sweden who had a background in property
or who could hold himself out as a specialist in London commercial property.”
Even allowing for Judge Fawcus’ endorsement of the view that:
“ it lies ill in the mouth of a professional valuer, who is giving a valuation for
mortgage lending purposes, to say that it was unreasonable for the party to whom
such valuation was given to rely on it”;
the lenders were hopelessly ill-equipped to interpret and use properly the valuation faxed to them.
There seems also little doubt that overseas lenders were slow to ask appropriate questions about
apparent discrepancies between valuation reports and the evidence available to them.  The Belgian
lenders in Banque Bruxelles Lambert v Eagle Star Insurance [1994] 2 EGLR 108 failed to query
the substantial differences between purchase prices and valuations and were accordingly held to be
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contributorily negligent.  In other words, the lenders were not entitled to rely blindly upon the
valuers’ figure.  It must be said that overseas lenders did not in the structured interviews show
themselves to be less willing to query the valuation figure than their UK counterparts.  There is
evidence, however, that the overseas lenders themselves are not happy with the quality and
usefulness of advice they receive in valuation reports.  Whereas four of the five UK lenders were
satisfied with the contents of their reports, three of the four overseas lenders were not.
There may be some evidence of a lack of appreciation of the professional status of the consultants
who report to the overseas lenders.  Two of the four overseas lenders interviewed did not insist on
using RICS valuers, which would be an elementary requirement for most UK lenders.
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5. Conclusions
The principal conclusion of this paper is that lending institutions undertaking property loans abroad
are in some key respects more exposed to risk than lenders operating in their own countries.  Despite
being responsible for a minority of lending to property companies in the 1990s, overseas lenders
have been found (or would have been found) to contribute negligently to losses made in the UK
property market in eight cases out of a total of only 12.  Seven of these overseas lenders were from
mainland Europe
Some of the reasons for this exposure, such as general differences of culture and attitude, may also
be common to other types of lending.  However, this research has identified the major grounds for
sucessful pleas of contributory negligence by lenders, which are failure to adhere to own lending
policy or procedures, inadequate checks on the borrower, unquestioning reliance on the valuation
and imprudent lending policy.  The analysis of cases indicates three issues which have proved in the
past and/or could prove in the future especially harmful to the interests of overseas lenders in the
UK property market.
First, they may lack an understanding of the sources of advice and the legal relationship which can
best protect their interests.  It is submitted that ample evidence has been adduced of confusions of
roles and relationships and an ignorance of where and by what means independent valuation advice
can be obtained.  The dangers of accepting valuations commissioned by the borrower rather than the
lender are fully illustrated in a number of cases and there is evidence to suggest that overseas
lenders are more inclined to accept this situation.
Second, overseas banks appear to have suffered frequently from a lack of clarity in the lines of
communication within their own organisations.  This is true of members of  the lending institution
trying to apply lending policies and it is true of communications between overseas branches (e.g. in
the UK) and the head office in the home country.
34
Third, there is a genuine lack of understanding of the use which can probably be made of  loan
valuations and the extent to which they form part of the lending decision.  There may be some
uncertainty in the law in this respect but the lender is not entitled to rely solely on the valuation
figure, without testing it against other information in the report.  The limitations of a single snapshot
in time pricing valuation are well  documented and the additional information in valuation reports is
essential to put it into context.  There is evidence to suggest that some overseas lenders are ill-
equipped to assimilate this advice and have relied on the valuation figure without the context.
While it would be unsafe to extrapolate prescriptively from the UK experience, because different
cross-border transactions will raise different problems, in one sense this is one of the points of the
paper.  Different legal and land use planning regimes, different markets and different professional
structures and traditions should call for an approach which is distinct from, but no less rigorous
than, the approach taken domestically in property lending.  In the eyes of the courts, all lenders are
equal, regardless of being home or overseas organisations.
Lending institutions, when entering overseas markets for the first time, should undertake preliminary
studies of how to obtain the necessary independent expert advice which is necessary for an informed
lending decision. Potential conflicts of interest require special forethought.  Lines of communication
will need to be well planned, so that information is conveyed to those capable of using it in the
context of established lending policy.  The personnel to whom it is directed must be capable of
understanding what the valuation (and other advice) does, and what it does not do (i.e. the
limitations).  Although they must wish to avoid a poor lending decision, lenders must also be aware
of the consequences of making one.
A lack of detailed information on the institutional context and legal framework of the country in
which the investment or lending is to take place constitutes an investment risk.  A lack of knowledge
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on the possibilities and pitfalls of attempting to recover damages from professionals employed in
that market is one such information deficiency.
However, if overseas lenders are to avoid the problems isolated by this analysis of cases decided in
the UK, they need to respond positively to these issues.  The evidence of the interview survey of
overseas lenders discussed previously suggests that not all these proposals are adopted and that not
all the lessons that could be learnt from their losses in the 1990s have been assimilated.
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